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Summary. This paper reports results from an agent-based simulation model that
comprises a day-ahead electricity market, a market for positive minute reserve and
a carbon exchange for CO2 emission allowances. Agents apply reinforcement
learning and optimize trading strategies over the two electricity markets. Simu­
lated results are closely similar to empirically observed prices at the German
power markets in 2006. This makes the model applicable for analyzing different
market designs in order to derive evidence for policy advice.
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1 Introduction
Several interrelated markets play a role in the electricity sector. From a short­
term (daily) trading perspective, markets for day-ahead scheduling and for real­
time dispatch or balancing energy, as well as auxiliary markets e.g. for CO? emis­
sion allowances are most prominent. Some participants have the potential to exert
market power in several of these markets, given the oligopolistic structure of pre­
sent-day electricity systems. These factors make electricity market modelling very
complex. The agent-based (AB) modelling methodology offers great flexibility of
specifying complex scenarios and may be a valuable tool for market analysis and
design in the electricity sector. AB simulation models can be used as fully control­
lable virtual laboratories for testing economic design alternatives in order to de­
termine the market designs that perform best in an environment of selfish agents
ITesfatsion 2006], This approach follows the postulation formulated by [Roth
2002] that markets should be designed using engineering tools, such as experi­
mentation and computation.
Several agent-based approaches for wholesale electricity market modelling
have been described in the literature, e.g. [Bower, Bunn 2001], [Nicolaisen, Pet­
rov, Tesfatsion 2001], [Bagnall, Smith 2005[, or [Sun, Tesfatsion 2007]. The con-
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tribution at hand presents a model of the German electricity sector that aims at
contributing to the challenge of analyzing market interrelations in the electricity
sector and may serve as a tool for engineering power markets.
2 The Model
The simulation model presented here comprises three markets: a day-ahead
electricity market, a market for balancing power at which positive minute reserve
is traded, and an exchange for CO2 emission allowance trading. Market partici­
pants are modelled as adaptive software agents who develop trading strategies
through reinforcement learning (here Q-learning). The agents face the problem of
trading on these interrelated markets. A more detailed description of the simula­
tion model is provided in [Weidlich, Veit 2008al.
Markets are interrelated only through the agents’ trading strategies. When
searching for profit maximizing bidding actions, agents consider opportunity
costs, i.e. foregone profits that they could have realized on the other markets.
Through this procedure they coordinate the bids they submit on all three simulated
markets. The strategies that agents can choose from on the considered markets are
described in Section 2.1, and the data input for the simulations presented here is
specified in Section 2.2.
2.1 Markets and the Agents’ Strategies
Agents act strategically both on the day-ahead market (DAM) and on the mar­
ket for minute reserve (balancing power market, BPM). Besides, they place price­
independent bids on the market for CO2 emission allowances with the volume cor­
responding to their daily allowance need (buying bids) or surplus (selling bids).
The demand side of the day-ahead market is represented as a fixed price­
insensitive load. Data of the hourly system's total load is used for representing
electricity demand. In the short-term, the assumption of a fixed load is realistic,
because electricity consumers usually do not have any price information at short
notice that would allow them to adapt their consumption to the price signals. As
the questions treated here focus on short-term market dynamics, fixed price­
insensitive load is a valid assumption.
Agents learn to submit profit-maximizing price-volume bids on both the day-
ahead electricity market and on the balancing power market. As reinforcement
learning is used for representing the agents’ search for the optimal bidding strate­
gies, the set of possible bids must be specified in advance. The definition of the
domain of possible bids is a sensitive task and should be calibrated so that real-
world prices are reproduced as closely as possible. As a bid on the day-ahead
market contains an offer quantity and a price at which this quantity is offered, the
action domain on the day-ahead market comprises the two dimensions of prices
and volumes. In the present model, agents can submit bid quantities expressed as a
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fraction ß  of their available capacity; possible fractions are set between 0 and 100
% in 20% steps; bid prices are set to the range from 0 to 100 EUR/MWh in 5
EUR/MWh steps. The resulting action domain is specified as follows:
M DAM = [pDAM ßDAM ] = [ { 0 > 0 j > { 0 ; 0 2 } ; ) { 1 0 0 J  0 }J ( | )
On the market for positive minute reserve (balancing power market), a prede­
fined quantity of positive minute reserve is procured. Six equally long bidding
blocs of four hours length are differentiated for every trading day: from 0 to 4 am,
from 4 to 8 am, and so forth. The tendered balancing capacity quantity Qj*1 M is
equal for every bidding bloc k.
The domain of possible actions on the balancing power market contains the two
dimensions capacity price {cap) -  the price for holding capacity in reserve over
the whole bidding period -  and energy price, i.e. the price a generator is paid for
produced minute reserve in case his plant is actually deployed for regulating pur­
poses. Possible prices range from 0 to 200 EUR/MW in 21 discrete steps for the
capacity price and from 0 to 100 EUR/MWh in five steps for the energy price.
This leads to the following action domain:
Mbpm = [pBPMcap,p BPMenergy]=[{0,0},{0,25},...,{200,100}] (2)
Agents learn strategics separately for the day-ahcad and for the balancing
power market. In the implementation, they have individual instances of the learn­
ing algorithm for each of the two markets. Moreover, strategies for each bidding
bloc on the balancing power market and for each hour on the day-ahead market
are learned separately.
For some types of power plants, the possible actions an agent can take differ
from the action domains presented in Formulas (1) and (2). Nuclear power plants
and lignite-fired power plants, for instance, do not allow short-term load changes,
but have to be kept at a relatively constant or slow-changing power rating. There­
fore, it is not realistic to assume that these power plants are deployed for strategic
bidding of hourly power delivery on the day-ahcad market. Output from these
power plant types are, thus, bid at their respective marginal generating costs. Fur­
thermore, it is assumed that weather forecasts are not yet precise enough for pre­
dicting the output power of wind energy converters in every hour of the following
day. Consequently, electricity from wind energy can not be bid strategically at the
day-ahead market. For taking into account the electricity amount produced by
wind turbines, the installed wind energy capacity of the basic scenario year (2006)
is multiplied with yearly average full load hours for estimating the capacity that is
available in every hour. This quantity is bid into the day-ahead market at a bid
price equal to the marginal cost.
Only few power plant types are suitable for delivering minute reserve. These
have to allow fast changes in load and must be ready to be fully activated within
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15 minutes. In the simulation model developed here, only gas-fired power plants
and hydro-power plants are assumed capable of delivering minute reserve; for
simplicity, no distinction is made between gas turbines or combined-cycle power
plants. Power output from all other plants can consequently only be bid on the
day-ahead market, and opportunity costs from the balancing power market are not
considered for these plants.
The CO2 emission allowance market is modelled as a sealed bid double-auction
that is cleared at the end of each trading day. Each agent submits one daily bid on
the allowance market, representing its allowance requirement or surplus for the
specific day, which is calculated for the whole portfolio of power plants it owns.
All generator agents that own fossil fuel fired power plants are initially en­
dowed with a certain amount of CO2 allowances. The initial allocation of allow­
ances is calculated according to a grandfathering rule, i.e. based on past emissions
for each single power plant. The sectors outside the electricity industry that are
covered by the emissions trading scheme submit a fixed supply and demand every
day. As little is known about CO2 mitigation costs of these sectors -  and conse­
quently about their valuation for certificates -  their supply and demand is cali­
brated so that average prices that arise endogenously during the simulation
roughly correspond to observed prices in the real-world carbon exchanges.
It is assumed that all agents seek to even up their open positions every day.
This entails that agents who sell electricity also make sure to have enough allow­
ances for the carbon dioxide emissions associated to their generation output.
Speculation is not considered in this model. The agents’ daily trading quantities
are calculated on the basis of initial endowments and of trading success on the cur­
rent trading day. The amount of carbon dioxide emitted during electricity genera­
tion is determined by the electricity amounts sold at the day-ahead market and by
deployed minute reserve. The quantities are multiplied with the emission factor of
the specific plant, quantifying the CO2 emissions associated with every MWh of
power output generated from that plant.
The remaining allowance budget that an agent has at its disposal at time al a
certain trading day is divided by the remaining days for which the allowances
were issued, in order to calculate a daily budget. This budget is subtracted from
the allowance quantity needed for power generation, thus resulting in the bid
quantity that an agent submits to the market operator. In consequence, if an
agent's budget for the current day is larger than its need for allowances, its bid
quantity becomes negative, which corresponds to a selling bid. It is assumed that
the market for CO2 allowances is fully competitive, and the industries outside the
electricity sector determine the market price. Generator agents submit price­
independent bids, i.e. they are price-takers on the allowance market.
Agents do not act strategically on the market for CO2 emission allowances -
they do not develop bidding strategies through reinforcement learning. However,
the costs incurred from allowance prices influence trading strategies on the elec­
tricity markets, as specified in the following section.
While optimizing their supply bids, agents consider opportunity costs that they
could have achieved on the other market if they had sold their capacity there.
Prices for carbon dioxide emission allowances are also included into the rein-
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forcement as opportunity costs. A generator would always have the opportunity to
solely sell certificates, thereby realizing a profit. Consequently, he aims at attain­
ing a profit equal to or higher that that which he could have achieved through sell­
ing allowances
2.2 Data Input
The simulation model is run with data that approximates the German electric­
ity sector. The system’s total electricity demand has been taken from 2006 load
data published by the Union for the Co-Ordination of Transmission of Electricity
(UCTE). Hourly UCTE demand data is published for every third Wednesday of
the month. The simulation results represent these days of each month of 2006.
Input data of the power generation mix roughly corresponds to German real-
world characteristics. The power plant portfolio is represented in an aggregate
way. The four dominant players in the market (E.ON AG, RWE Power AG, Vat­
tenfall Europe AG and EnBW Kraftwerke AG) are represented in more detail, and
further players are introduced so that the overall installed capacity and the propor­
tions of different power plant technologies (coal-fired, gas-fired, hydro etc.) are
properly represented. Within the power plant portfolio of one generator, all plants
using the same fuel or technology are subsumed under one generating unit, and
average efficiencies are assumed for these units.
3 Simulation Results
Through simulation runs with the described data input, it should be verified if
simulated prices on the day-ahead and on the balancing power market resemble
those observed at the real-world markets in Germany (Section 3.1). Furthermore,
the impact of emissions trading is analyzed in order to assure that it corresponds to
the real-world characteristics (Section 3.2).
3.1 Reproducing Daily Courses of Prices
For the purpose of validating the developed model against real-world data,
those days for which the system’s total load is known from UCTE data are simu­
lated and resulting prices are compared to EEX and balancing power market
prices. As the real-world markets may show extraordinary prices on the specific
simulated day, additional average daily courses of prices over all workdays of the
same month are calculated and compared to the simulation outcomes. Figures I-5
display simulation results for runs with Q-learning (simulations ran over 7,300 it­
erations; the outcome of one run is the average market price over the last 365 it­
erations. Results are averaged over ten simulation runs with different random
number seeds at each run).
8 Anke Weidlich, Daniel Veit
Day-Ahead Electricity Market. September 2006. Q-Learning
Fig. 1. Simulated and real-world prices on the day-ahead market, September 2006
Fig. 2. Simulated and real-world prices on the day-ahead market. January 2006
The continuous lines plot the simulation outcome for the third Wednesdays of
every month; the dashed lines plot the empirically observed prices of the same
days, and the dotted lines represent average prices over all workdays of the spe­
cific months. Figures 1 and 2 display hourly results on the day-ahead market,
where empirically observed prices correspond to prices for hourly contracts fixed
in the daily spot auction operated by the European Energy Exchange AG (Ger­
many’s main power exchange).
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Fig. 3. Simulated and real-world prices on the balancing power market, September 2006
Fig. 4. Simulated and real-world prices on the balancing power market, January 2006
Figures 3 and 4 show results from the simulated balancing power market and
the empirically observed prices are averaged over the prices published by the four
balancing market operators.
The simulated prices observed on the day-ahead market and on the balancing
power market stem from the same simulation run and are a consequence of agents
bidding on these two markets (and in addition on the market for CCb emission al­
lowances) and optimizing their strategies in face of these market interrelations.
Simulation results for this basic scenario reveal that real-world prices can be
reproduced remarkably well for spring, summer and fall months. In winter
months, however, simulated prices deviate more strongly from empirically ob­
served prices. In these months of high system load, agents may have more leeway
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for Strategie bidding than has been assumed in the model presented here. More­
over, power plant availability due to maintenance or other planned outages have
not been considered here. Although maintenance is mainly carried out during
summertime, even small outages may already have a large effect on electricity
prices in times when the demand-supply ratio is tight -  i.e. during the winter -
which may be a reason for the differences between simulation results and real-
world electricity prices.
The demand, i.e. the tendered quantity on the balancing power market, is equal
for all bidding blocs. This market is cleared first, and the day-ahead market is op­
erated subsequently. As the available supply capacity and the demand quantity in
the balancing power market is the same in every hour, differences in prices be­
tween the bidding blocs can only result from the inclusion of opportunity costs in
the agent’s reasoning. The simulation outcome on the balancing power market
shows characteristic daily courses of prices, in which capacity prices in bidding
blocs 3 and 4 -  and 5 in winter months -  are considerably higher than those in the
nocturnal bidding blocs. Similar characteristics can be observed in the real-world
balancing power markets in Germany, although the high prices in the fifth bidding
bloc that occur in most winter months can not be reproduced by the simulation
model. It is remarkable that the rather low capacity prices in some summer months
can be reproduced by the simulation although the possible bid prices that range up
to 200 EUR/MWh would theoretically allow much higher prices to occur. This re­
sult strengthens confidence in the model validity.
Variability between different runs (i.e. runs with different random number
seeds) is very low for simulations with Q-learning. The standard deviation for the
resulting prices of the ten repetitions ranges between 0.2 and 2.3 EUR/MWh for
different hours on the day-ahead electricity market and between 0.05 and 3.9
EUR/MW for bidding blocks on the balancing power market. With these low vari­
ances, one single simulation run already delivers meaningful and reliable results.
In the simulation model, prices are mainly influenced by the demand level, as
the principal difference of market conditions in the hours of the considered months
is the system’s total load. Power plant availability is considered to be constant
over the year. This is a simplification which might be altered in future model de­
velopment. In reality, maintenance of power plants is scheduled discontinuously
over the year; around 2% of the total installed generating capacity is off due to
maintenance during winter months, and around 10% during summer months
[VDN 2004]. In those simulated hours in which day-ahead electricity prices devi­
ate considerably from real-world prices, power plant availability may be an impor­
tant reason. Besides maintenance, an even more important factor in this context is
the available renewable energy production. In the simulation model, renewable
energy availability is also assumed to be constant, whereas in reality, water levels
of hydroelectric installations and electricity generation from wind energy varies
considerably throughout the year and during the day. The high prices in July 2006,
which can not be replicated by the simulation model, are also explicable by re­
duced power plant availability. During the very hot summer in Germany in 2006,
it occured that the maximum admissible temperature for rivers was reached and
the cooling water flow for thermal power plants had to be reduced as a conse-
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quence. Additional drought in many European regions reduced hydro energy
availability [EGL 2006]. The combination of these factors, which were not repre­
sented in the simulation model, made power prices rise considerably above usual
levels in July and, to a lower extent, August 2006.
3.2 Impact of Emissions Trading on Electricity Prices
The data presented in the preceding section corresponds to simulations in which
emission allowance trading was integrated -  just like in the real-world market of
the corresponding time frame. In further simulation runs, it is tested how emis­
sions trading affects prices on the electricity markets. For this purpose, scenarios
without CO2 emissions trading are run and compared to the reference scenario re­
sults. The outcome of this comparison is depicted in Figure 5 for the day-ahead
electricity market. In order to facilitate the graphical inspection of simulation re­
sults, Figure 5 contains resulting prices for all simulated hours of the day-ahead
market, i.e. for all 12*24 observations. As prices on the electricity market are
strongly influenced by the system’s total load (= demand), simulated prices are
sorted by load quantities in the corresponding hours. System load is plotted at the
second ordinate of the diagrams.
Fig. 5. Impact of CO2 emissions trading on day-ahead electricity prices
It can be shown that a large fraction of opportunity costs resulting from the
possibility of selling CO2 emission allowances is successfully passed over to elec­
tricity market bids, which ultimately raises prices at the day-ahead market and also
at the balancing power market. Because of different emission and competition
situations in the single hours, the absolute increase in electricity prices is not con­
stant across the simulated hours and bidding blocks.
In hours of low demand, the introduction of emissions trading has hardly any
effect on day-ahead electricity prices, because only few power plants that incur
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high CO2 emissions are deployed, and supply side competition is strong. In con­
trast, the difference in prices is considerable in high demand hours, in which many
CO2 intensive power plants arc running and competition is weak, so agents can
successfully pass over additional opportunity costs to their bid prices. Over a large
range of intermediate demand situations, deviations between the scenarios with
and without emissions trading fluctuate to some extent. The intuition behind this
result is that these hours with similar demand situations belong to different
months, and CO2 prices differ across months. Hours with very high demand all be­
long to the winter months in which demand is high and consequently many fossil
fuel power plants are operated, resulting in (evenly) higher CO2 allowance prices.
This is also illustrated by the green curves that plots prices for CO2 allowances in
Figure %.
As a consequence, it can be concluded that emissions trading considerably in­
fluences electricity prices and that it is the main cause for differences in prices re­
sulting for hours with similar demand situations; this is true on both the day-ahead
and the balancing power market. Yearly average prices are 13.3 % higher for sce­
narios with emissions trading on the day-ahead market, and 56.8 % higher on the
balancing power market.
4 Conclusions
In this contribution, an agent-based simulation model representing the core
features of the German electricity market is presented. The model comprises a
day-ahead market for hourly electricity delivery contracts, a procurement market
for positive minute reserve and a market for CO2 emission allowances. Simulated
prices from this model are remarkably close to those observed in reality for many
months of the year 2006, both on the day-ahead market (compared to EEX prices)
and on the balancing power market (compared to the balancing power markets op­
erated in the German electricity sector). Besides, the effect of CO2 emissions trad­
ing on simulated prices is comparable to that observed in the real market, i.e. a
large proportion of opportunity costs are successfully passed on to electricity bids,
which ultimately raises electricity prices.
The presented model can be used to analyze a variety of possible market struc­
tures and market mechanisms with the aim of finding good market designs that
take into account market interrelations and other aspects of real-world electricity
markets. Analyses of this kind have been conducted by the authors, and additional
scenarios are currently developed. For example, the impact of the tendered minute
reserve quantity on day-ahead and balancing power market prices is studied in
[Weidlich, Veit 2008aJ and a variation of the settlement rule as well as the impact
of several divestiture scenarios are analysed in [Weidlich, Veit 2008bf Results
from these simulations demonstrate the usefulness of the agent-based simulation
model presented here.
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